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The writing of much medieval political 
history has been dominated by what one 
might call a Weberian paradigm. For the 
sociologist Max Weber the gradual drift to-
ward a greater “rationalisation” of human 
affairs, intellectual as well as political and 
economic, was central to his conception of 
history.1 Weber believed that in the realm 
of politics and administration the inherent 
technical superiority of bureaucratic as 
opposed to other forms of organisation 
was one of the central facts of the sociol-
ogy of politics.2 One can see this Weberian 
paradigm unfolding in the classic book by 
J. R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the 
Modern State.3 The reader emerges from 
the pages of this book with the impres-
sion that European political history is the 
story of how the modern state struggled 
to reach its true form, which, although im-
manent in the medieval and early modern 
periods, was not fully realised. Strayer sees 
as essential to a modern state “impersonal, 
relatively permanent political institutions … 
which allow a certain degree of specialisa-
tion in political affairs and thus increase the 
efficiency of the political process …” The 
superior efficiency, rationality, and integra-
tive capacity of these institutions explain 
their success. They not only allowed their 
masters to out-compete everyone else on 
the political scene, they also promoted the 
good of society as a whole.4 As Strayer puts 
it, “the state gave greater peace and secu-
rity, more opportunity for the good life, than 
loose associations of communities”.5 
Although much of the political history of 
Europe in the twelfth through fourteenth 
centuries can be understood in this inter-
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pretive framework, not all can. In the midst of the seemingly inevitable triumph of rationality, there 
were outbreaks of irrationality. One of the most striking of these was the emergence in the early 
fourteenth century of charges of fantastic evil-doing – demonolatry, magic, and sexual perversion 
– as a staple of the discourse of political conflict at the highest levels of European society.6 
This was especially true of the reign of Philip IV of France, whose last years were marked by 
some spectacular eruptions of the fantastic onto the political scene. For example, in 1301 Philip 
arrested Bernard Saisset, the bishop of Pamiers.7 Although the principal charges against the 
bishop involved treason, Saisset was also accused of being a manifest heretic. He had spoken, 
so it was charged, against the sacrament of penance and maintained that fornication committed 
by people in holy orders was not a sin. He had also asserted that Pope Boniface VIII had acted 
against truth and justice in canonising Philip’s grandfather, Louis IX, who was residing in Hell.8
The fantastic did not figure too prominently in Philip’s prosecution of Bishop Saisset, but it was a 
principal part of the case against another bishop, Guichard of Troyes. Arrested in 1308, Guichard 
was accused of using black magic to bring about the death of Philip’s wife, Queen Jeanne, in 1305. 
He was said to have prepared a poison compounded of toads, scorpions, and spiders with which to 
kill various princes of the realm.9 He had conjured up the Devil, who appeared in the form of a flying 
monk with horns on the front of his head.10 He was a heretic who had spat on the cross. He was a 
murderer, a thief, a simoniac, a sodomite, a usurer, a forger, and a counterfeiter. Most fantastic of 
all, he was said to be the son of an incubus that had impregnated his mother.11 
Philip also launched such accusations against Pope Boniface VIII. The pontiff was said to be 
an open materialist, having no belief in the immortality of the soul, and holding that all happiness 
was found in this world; he does not believe in transubstantiation and never pays honour to the host 
during mass; he neglects all fasts; he refuses confession to prisoners, and forces clerks to reveal 
the secrets of the confessional; he has approved a book by Arnold of Vilanova, condemned as he-
retical by the University of Paris; he condones all sexual sins, and commits most of them; he keeps 
a private demon and consults sorcerers; he has clerks executed in his presence urging on the 
executioners; he murdered Celestine [his predecessor as pope] and imprisoned all who questioned 
his abdication; he makes money of everything and declares that the pope cannot be a simonist; he 
has caused the loss of the Holy Land through using the funds for other purposes: he breaks legal 
marriages and has made a married nephew a cardinal; he has set up silver images of himself in 
the churches, so that people should worship him; he treats all Frenchmen as Patarines; he has 
often repeated that he would gladly lose the church to ruin France, that he will make martyrs of all 
Frenchmen, and that he would rather be a dog or an ass than belong to that country.12
Perhaps Philip’s most famous victims were the Templars. Arrested en masse in October 1307 
they were accused of denying Christ and spitting on his image during their reception into the 
order. During their reception they were also ordered to engage in sexual relations with other 
members of the order whenever required to do so. And finally they had turned to the worship of 
idols.13 The order was dissolved in 1312 by Pope Clement V while its grand master went to the 
stake in 1314.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/04/2020 04:32:26 |
90
Power and Fear in Philip IV’s France HISTOREIN
V
O
L
U
M
E
 6 (2006)
91
Why were fantasy, fear, and power so closely linked in the early fourteenth century?14 Frankly 
admitting that this is speculation, this article suggests that some of the roots of this eruption of 
the fantastic into high politics lay in the glaring contradiction between the vaunting aspirations 
of early fourteenth-century rulers and the limited means at their disposal for accomplishing 
the actual tasks of government. Throughout western Europe kings had by the early fourteenth 
century made themselves the effective leaders of their polities. Much was now expected of them, 
but the tools they had with which to fulfil those expectations were limited. Philip’s reign came at 
the end of a long period of institutional development of the French monarchy.15 But one should 
not exaggerate the sophistication or capabilities of his government. Its servants were few and 
its procedures relatively unsophisticated.
All in all, the French royal government scored low on what some political scientists would call the 
“autonomy of the state”.16 By “autonomy of the state” is generally meant, first, the extent to which 
states can become social actors in their own rights, endowed with their own interests apart from 
those of any particular social class, and second, the capacity of the state to act contrary to the 
wishes of those classes that are socially and economically dominant.17 In some ways we can 
regard medieval royal governments as having a high degree of autonomy. Government was 
the personal responsibility of the king. Royal servants were the king’s personal agents, freely 
chosen by him and answerable only to him. They thus may have had an unusually high capacity 
to act contrary to the interests of the politically and economically dominant classes. However, 
it can also be argued that the autonomy of the medieval state was relatively limited. Kings 
were definitely members of a particular social class, the land-owning aristocracy. Like all other 
aristocrats, their economic well-being depended primarily on their capacity to extract surplus 
from the peasants living on their estates. The techniques they used to exploit their estates did 
not differ qualitatively from those of other aristocrats. Kings thus shared the interests of the 
dominant class in a direct and personal fashion. Moreover, they were bound to other members 
of the aristocracy by many personal ties, including those of vassalage and marriage. They par-
ticipated in an aristocratic culture that was largely closed to members of other classes. Finally, 
their governments were staffed primarily by members of the aristocracy.
Paradoxically the very systematisation and institutionalisation of royal power that took place 
during the thirteenth century also constrained the king’s room for political manoeuvre. In the 
field of law and justice, for example, the king had the duty to do justice, but that duty was more 
and more circumscribed by precedent, ordinances, and the theorising of a self-conscious legal 
profession with a high regard for itself. If kings wanted to appear to rule “justly”, there were 
bounds to what actions they could take. In short, the growth in the size of the kingdom and the 
sophistication of its government inevitably created a dense “web of resistance” to the desires 
and goals of an individual king.18
Philip was probably the most powerful king that France had seen, but his range of political 
manoeuvre was nevertheless constrained. And he had a lot of problems with which to deal. He 
and his policies were often fervently disliked. Perhaps nothing annoyed his subjects so much as 
his constant pursuit of cash. The expedients Philip devised to raise money alienated many, and 
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troubled his own conscience.19 The ferocious tactics used by royal commissioners to bring in the 
money at times more resembled brigandage than the orderly execution of a state duty.20 Philip’s 
efforts to shore up his financial position by manipulating the coinage were also highly unpopular. 
In 1306 the king’s alteration of the value of the kingdom’s coinage touched off riots in Châlons, 
Laon, and Paris. In Paris rioters forced Philip himself to take refuge in the Temple.21 
Away from Paris in the countryside were royal servants who, few in number and at times isolated 
from one another, were commonly coerced, harassed, and defied. Two examples will suffice. In 
1301 the royal viguier of Carcassonne set off into the hills of the county of Foix to levy a tax that 
had been authorised for the war in Flanders. He found the county’s towns closed against him and 
arrayed as if for war. What money he did manage to raise, he lost, along with his mules, to an am-
bush by the count’s bayle. In 1303 the royal enquêteur Jean de Picquigny, who had been sent south 
to investigate the behaviour of Bishop Saisset, was forced by riotous inhabitants of Carcassonne to 
remove prisoners held in the inquisitors’ dungeons and lodge them in the royal prison, an act that 
earned him excommunication and the personal detestation of Pope Benedict XI.
Some of Philip’s subjects may have questioned his fitness to rule. Bishop Saisset was reported to 
have said that Philip was the handsomest man in the world, but did nothing except stare at men.22 
Bernard Délicieux, a Franciscan friar who led an anti-inquisitorial movement in the south of France 
in the first years of the fourteenth century, proclaimed that the king was more interested in money 
than justice. He was useless to his subjects, less a king than a pig who wanted nothing else than 
to be always with his wife.23 Even within the ranks of dedicated supporters of the Capetian dynasty 
there were dark thoughts about the king. Jean de Joinville, companion and biographer of Louis IX, 
in a thinly veiled reference to Philip IV, wrote in his life of the sainted king that Louis’ acts promised 
great honour to those of his line who were like him in doing well, and equal dishonour to those 
descendants who did not choose to follow him in performing good works; great dishonour, in-
deed, to those of his line pursuing the paths of evil, since people would point to them and say that 
the sainted king from whom they were sprung would never have committed such evil.24
At a distance of seven centuries Philip may appear to have been a major architect of the French 
monarchy’s governing structure, but to many of his subjects he, or at least his agents, appeared 
more like reiving brigands than the agents of a “most Christian king”.25 
To summarise, to be the king of France in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries was no 
easy task. Aspirations and expectations were grand, but the kingdom was an immense patchwork 
of individuals and institutions that hampered the king and his agents at practically every turn. Philip 
knew many successes, but he also knew many failures. His reign was a balancing act amidst a host 
of other power actors: great lords, churchmen, town governments, village communities, and his 
own nascent bureaucracy. The actual business of governing was messy and carried on in the face 
of obstructionism, foot-dragging, and endless petty, and sometimes not so petty, challenges.26
In an environment where real men and women remained stubbornly resistant to efforts to rule 
them, combating and defeating fantastic enemies could have its advantages. By charging people 
with accusations of demonolatry, witchcraft, and heresy, Philip took on enemies that were at 
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once terrifying but powerless, since they were mere chimeras of the imagination. In this shadow 
realm of the fantastic and the imaginary, Philip could symbolically, dramatically, and above all, 
successfully, act out his crucial role in Christian society.
To do so, however, he and his advisors had to create what one political scientist has called a 
“zone of terror” within the French political process.27 This article does not argue that Philip was a 
blood-stained tyrant. He clearly took his role as a sacral king seriously. He took care to portray 
himself as embodying the loftiest ideas of Christian kingship.28 Philip himself declared that no 
other kingdom abounded in “such peace, such regard for justice, such prosperity, such happi-
ness” as did France. This prosperity derived from “a highly developed regard for justice, from 
which in turn, by the grace of God, has come the fullness of our peace”.29
Clearly the overwhelming majority of Philip’s interactions with his subjects fell within the con-
ventional rules and legitimate techniques of early fourteenth-century politics. Indeed, as J. R. 
Strayer has put it, Philip was a sort of “constitutional” king who 
tried to conform to the traditions of the French monarchy and the practices of the French 
government. As far as possible, he governed the realm through a well-established system of 
courts and administrative officials. He always asked the advice of responsible men; he was 
influenced by that advice in working out the details of his general policy. He tried to stay at least 
within the letter of the law; he tried to observe the customs of the kingdom. When he had to 
go beyond established custom he always sought to justify his action and to obtain the consent 
of those who were affected.30
Philip certainly did not institute a regime of terror in the kingdom of France, in which everyone 
was caught up in one fashion or another in the terror process.31 In a few cases, however, his 
government relied heavily on force and fear. It is not surprising that many of these cases in-
volved ecclesiastics, simultaneously key players in the French political system and members of 
a transnational hierarchy whose head was in Rome. 
Whether or not Philip and his advisors believed in the accusations they brought against his 
enemies is impossible to know. But in a sense the charges of trafficking with demons, heresy, 
sodomy and idolatry brought against Saisset, Guichard of Troyes, Boniface VIII, and the Templars 
can be understood as examples of the “big lie”. To prove that one is innocent, not only of an act 
that one has not committed, but that no one has ever committed, is, paradoxically, difficult.32 To 
the politically active part of the kingdom’s population, the very outlandishness of the accusations 
may have made them more believable. For who would believe that the rex christianissimus 
would fabricate such accusations? 33 
Moreover, the campaigns against these fantastic enemies helped portray the monarchy as 
competent and effective. Philip’s real enemies – the Flemings, the English, angry taxpayers, etc. 
– were not so easy to deal with. Contending with them was a frustrating, protracted process, 
one in which it was difficult for a man to make himself appear a capable ruler. But once the king 
and his ministers escaped the trammels of reality and entered the world of fantasy, they fought 
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on terrain where victory was assured.34 The advantage of fighting phantom enemies guilty of 
non-existent crimes is that there is no objective standard by which to judge whether or not they 
have actually been defeated.
Philip was fortunate in that he did not simply have to proclaim the guilt of his opponents. Legal 
developments in the thirteenth century had given him and other rulers a tool that allowed them 
to extract a confession from almost anyone. This was the procedure by inquisition, with its fre-
quent recourse to torture. Moreover, in the case of the inquisition of heretical depravity, many 
of the normal procedural safeguards were ignored.35 The ability of a judge to proceed with an 
investigation without a formal accusation being lodged against the suspect and to use torture 
enabled the king and his ministers to procure whatever admissions of guilt were needed. Many 
Templars, when given the opportunity of what they thought might be a fair hearing, claimed that 
their confessions were untrue and had been extracted from them by brutal means. The trap-
pings of legality could be maintained while the accused were deprived of any effective means of 
demonstrating their innocence. Even the burning of those Templars who offered to defend the 
order before papal commissioners in Paris, an act that crushed effective resistance to the royal 
case among the surviving Templars, could be dressed in the mantle of legality.36
The king’s triumph over non-existent enemies may have been very satisfying to his subjects. 
Rulers, of course, undertake many concrete tasks, but much of what they do is theatrical. They 
strive not so much to achieve real effects as to demonstrate that right order prevails in the world, 
that the shared universe of moral values endures.37 Philip, in pursuing his fantastic enemies, 
spectacularly reaffirmed the kingdom’s solidarity and restored the sacred moral order.
Philip saw himself, and was seen by his subjects, as a sacral king. In reality he was a sacral 
king constrained on all sides by determined enemies and recalcitrant subjects; but in the realm 
of fantasy, he was invincible. By triumphing over chimerical enemies he could truly appear, at 
least for a few moments, to be that which the abbot of Cluny called him in 1294, “the leader of 
the cause of God and the church and the fighter for all of Christendom”.38
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